Mamie J. Tempest v. James K. Richardson and Wilma L. Richardson : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1956
Mamie J. Tempest v. James K. Richardson and
Wilma L. Richardson : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Gustin, Richards & Mattsson; Attorneys for Appellant;
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Tempest v. Richardson, No. 8466 (Utah Supreme Court, 1956).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/2520
Case No. 8466 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
':'MAMIE J. TEMPEST, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
:,,'JAMES K. RICHARDSON and 
·WILMA L. RICHARDSON, his wife, 
'' 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
fAppeal From The District Court of the Third Judicial 
District in and for the County of Salt Lake 
HoNORABLE A. H. ELLETT, Judge 
GUSTIN, RICHARDS & MATTSSON 
Attorneys for Appellant 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INDEX 
Page 
STATEMENT OF FACTS ------------------------------------------------------------ 1 
STATEMENT OF POINTS____________________________________________________________ 4 
ARGUMENT 
1. There is a genuine issue as to a material fact____________ 4 
(a) Defendants were negligent and their negl·igence 
was the proximate cause of injury to plaintiff.____ 4 
(b) Plaintiff was not negligent. ---------------------------------- 10 
TABLE OF CASES 
Deacy v. McDonnell, et al. (Conn.) 38 Atl. 2d 181. _____________________ 5-8 
Hamblet v. Buffalo Library Garage Co., Inc., 225 N.Y. Supp. 
716 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 7 
Knight v. Southern Pac. Co., 52 Utah 42, 172 P. 689 ________________ 12 
Knox v. Snow, ______ Utah ______ , 229 P. 2d 874 ________________________________ 14 
Martin v. Jones, ______ Utah ______ , 253 P. 2d 359 ____________________________ 14 
McHenry v. Howells et al., (Ore.) 272 P. 2d 210________________________ 4 
Nielson v. Mauchley, 115 Utah 68, 202 P. 2d 547 ____________________ 12 
Ray v. Consolidated Freightway1s, ______ Utah ______ , 289 P. 2d 
196 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 10 
Rogalski v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 3 Utah 2d 203, 282 P. 2d 
304 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 11 
Wardhaugh v. Weisfield's Inc. (Wash.) 264 P. 2d 870 ____________ 7-13 
Young et al. v. Felornia et al., ______ Utah ______ , 244 P. 2d 862____ 9 
TEXTS 
38 Am. J ur., Section 184, Page 861. ... ------------------------------------------ 13 
Restatement of the Law of Torts, Sec. 342, Page 933________________ 5 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
MAMIE J. TEMPEST, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
JAMES K. RICHARDSON and 
WILMA L. RICHARDSON, his wife, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 8466 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATE1fENT OF FACTS 
A summary judgment in favor of the defendants and 
each of them was entered in this case on November 10, 
1955 (Tr. 7). The summary judgment w.as granted upon 
a motion which was based upon the pleadings and deposi-
tion of the plaintiff (Tr. 5). 
Plaintiff's complaint alleges that the plaintiff was 
a guest in the home of the defendants at 1754 Oakridge 
Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah. The plaintiff asked to be di-
rected to the lavatory in said home and was carelessly 
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and negligently directed by the defendant Wilma L. 
Richardson toward a door which, urhrnown to the plain-
tiff, but well known to the defendants, opened not into 
the lavatory but onto a stairway leading to the basement 
of said home; that the door to which plaintiff's attention 
was directed was constructed and maintained in a negli-
gent manner creating a hidden trap unknown to the 
plaintiff but known to the defendants (Tr. 1-2). 
Defendants set forth the defense that the complaint 
failed to state a claim against the defendants. They fur-
ther alleged that the plaintiff was a guest insofar as the 
dining room, living room, kitchen and bathroom of said 
home were concerned but was not .a guest of the defend-
ants insofar as the remaining portions of said hon1e were 
concerned; that the defendants were not negligent and 
that if plaintiff suffered injury or damage the same was 
caused or proximately contributed to by the negligent 
.acts or omissions of the plaintiff (Tr. 3). 
The references to the testimony given by plaintiff 
on her deposition will be referred to by the page numbers 
of the deposition which is marked Transcript page 11. 
:Mrs. Tempest in her deposition testified that she had 
known the Richardsons for a long time and considered 
thmn good friends. There is confusion as to whether she 
had been in this particular house before the evening of 
August 12, 1D5-1-, but if so, it had only been upon one or 
two occasions (D. 2-4). ' 
I 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3 
n~ l On August 12, 1954 Mrs. Tempest arrived at the 
~' Richardsons' home about 5 or 5 :30 P.M. and went into 
~tmli! the living room and then out onto the patio (D. 6). The 
em~ floor plan of the home as described by Mrs. Tempest is 
1nn~1 as indicated in defendant's Exhibit 1 attached to the 
n1~. deposition (D. 7-12). About 7:00 o'clock they went into 
ott1 the dining room for dinner. Around 9:30 Mrs. Tempest 
went into the kitchen with Mrs. Richardson and after a 
short time in the kitchen Mrs. Tempest walked into the 
utility area and while walking across that area said: "I 
am going to the lavatory." Mrs. Richardson answered: 
"The light is on." (Tr. 13-14). "\Vhen Mrs. Tempest 
re.ached the hall she saw that there was a door open and 
a light shining out into the hall, but she did not remember 
of any light being on in the hall itself. :Mrs. Tempest 
walked down the hall to the lighted door or room, looked 
in and did not see the lavatory but saw a door right next 
to the den or bedroom, which door was closed (Tr. 14). 
She did not see any other light in the utility area and did 
not see the bathroom. l\Irs. Tempest had w.alked past the 
bathroom when she went into the utility area but did not 
know it was there and saw the light shining from the room 
into the hallway. There was plenty of light in the hallway 
so that she could see her way ( Tr. 15). After she had 
looked into the den or bedroom and did not see the lav.a-
tory she opened the door next to it with her right hand 
and walked forward and immediately fell. The door 
swung in, but there was no light on and she did not see 
the stairway. There is no landing inside the doorway 
leading to the stairway .and the first step down is right 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
next to the hall floor so that there is a sheer straight ~: 
drop down the stairs (Tr. 16-17). As she did not see 
the bathroom she does not know whether there was a 
light on or not (Tr. 20). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. THERE IS A GENUINE ISSUE AS TO A MATERIAL ~ 
FACT. 
(a) DEFENDANTS WERE NEGLIGENT AND THEIR 
NEGLIGENCE WAS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF INJURY 
TO PLAINTIFF. 
(b) PLAINTIFF WAS NOT NEGLIGENT. 
ARGUl\1:ENT 
1. THERE IS A GENUINE ISSUE AS TO A MATERIAL 
FACT. 
(a) DEFENDANTS WERE NEGLIGENT AND THEIR 
NEGLIGENCE WAS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF INJURY 
TO PLAINTIFF. 
The only question involved is whether after consider-
ation of the pleadings and deposition of the plaintiff there 
is or is not .a genuine issue as to a material fact. There 
is no dispute in this case but that plaintiff while in de-
fendant's home was a social guest and is considered a 
licensee. lllcflcnry v. Ilozrells, et al., (Ore.) 272 P. 2d 
210 (1954). 
Plaintiff being a licensee, the defendants owed her 
the duty to use reasonable care not to injure her through 
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any act of negligence on their part and to warn her of 
dangerous conditions which they knew but which they 
could not reasonably assume that she knew or by a rea-
sonable use of her faculties would observe. Deacy v. 
11lcDonnell, et al. (Conn.) 38 Atl. 2d 181 (1944). 
932. 
Restatement of the Law of Torts, Sec. 342, Page 
"DANGEROUS CONDITIONS KNOWN TO 
POSSESSOR. A Possessor of land is subject to 
liability for bodily harm caused to gratuitous 
licensees by a natural or artificial condition there-
on if, but only if, he 
(a) knows of the condition and realizes that 
it involves an unreasonable risk to them and has 
reason to believe that they will not discover the 
condition or realize the risk, and 
(b) invites or permits them to enter or re-
main upon the land, without exercising reasonable 
care 
( i) to make the condition reasonable safe, or 
(ii) to warn them of the condition and the 
risk involved therein." 
\Vith this premise established and which we do not 
believe will be questioned, we come to the question 
whether under the pleadings and the testimony given by 
plaintiff it could be said that no re.asonable person could 
find that the defendants or either one of them were not 
negligent and that their negligence was not the proximate 
cause of plaintiff's injuries. 
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In this case Mrs. Tempest was not familiar with the 
premises and after leaving the kitchen where she and 
Mrs. Richardson had been together 1\Irs. Tempest pro-
ceeded some distance across the utility room. As she 
was so proceeding she told Mrs. Richardson that she 
was going to the lavatory and Mrs. Richardson stated 
that the light was on. No statement or warning was 
given to 1\Irs. Tempest regarding the cellar stairway. 
The evidence does not disclose whether Mrs. Richard-
son knew that 1\frs. Tempest had already passed the 
lavatory, if in fact she had, nor does the evidence disclose 
that :Mrs. Richardson was aware that the light was on 
in the den or bedroom, that being the room right next 
to the door to the cellar steps. 
We can, however, assume that 1\frs. Richardson was 
familiar with her own home and knew that if one had 
proceeded across the utility room to the hall that they 
would not observe the bathroom which was recessed off 
the utility room. If she knew the light was on in the 
bedroom or den then she knew or should have known 
that a person reaching the hallway would be attracted 
thereto and finding that it was not the bathro01n might 
try the door adjacent thereto which opened onto a stair-
way leading to the basement. ~Irs. Richardson did know 
that the door to the stairs opened inward and that the 
step dropped innnediately down, there being no platform 
flush with the hall floor and that one taking a step for-
ward through the door would immediately descend 
downward. 
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Under such circumstances can it be said that no 
reasonable person would not come to the conclusion that 
Mrs. Richardson was negligent in not warning Mrs. 
Tempest of the stairway 1 If, in fact, Mrs. Richardson 
knew how far Mrs. Tempest had passed across the utility 
area would not this have a bearing on the situation 1 
If so, we have a material fact which must be determined. 
The same conclusion would be true concerning the ques-
tion as to whether or not Mrs. Richardson knew that the 
light was on in the bedroom and that the door was open 
so that ~\Irs. Tempest might be attracted thereto. 
In the case of Wardhaugh v. Weisfield's, Inc. 
(Wash.) 264 P. 2d 870 (Dec. 1953) the defendant had 
constructed a ramp in its store in such a manner that it 
looked as though it were level. The Court held that such 
deceptive condition may be considered as negligence. 
In this case if plaintiff had attempted to go to the 
lavatory ·without instructions and had received injuries 
the question would be entirely different. However, plain-
tiff was instructed that the light was on. She proceeded 
to the lighted room as instructed which turned out to be 
a den or bedroom rather than a bathroom .and she had no 
warning that the door next thereto guarded a dangerous 
stairway leading to the basement. 
In the case of Hamblet v. Buffalo Library Garage 
Co., Inc., 225 N. Y. Supp. 716, a person on the premises 
was instructed how to reach the lavatory and the Court 
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held that plaintiff had the right, to a certain extent, to 
rely upon instructions and to govern his conduct accord-
ingly. 
In the case of Deacy v. McDonnell, et al., supra, 
where the plaintiff went to visit her sister who was a 
I: 
servant in the home of the defendants and it became ~ ' 
time for plaintiff to leave, the servants of the defendant j: 
failed to turn on the light so that plaintiff might discover 1 
the step down to the porch and by reason thereof she 
fell. The Court held : 
"It was for the trial court to determine as 
a question of fact whether the situation was or 
was not one in which the servants could not rea-
sonably assume that the plaintiff knew or by 
the reasonable use of her senses would discover 
the step down to the porch and which, therefore, 
fell within the principle under which an owner 
is bound to take precautions to protect a licensee 
of whose presence he knows .against a dangerous 
condition upon the premises. It could reasonably 
reach the conclusions that it was the servants' 
duty either to turn on the lights or warn her of 
the danger created by the step and that, for their 
breach of that duty, the defendants are respons-
ible. These conclusions are sufficient to sustain 
the ruling that there was .a breach of the duty 
which the defendants owed the plaintiff." 
In addition to the facts testified to in plaintiff's 
deposition, it appears to us that there are material facts 
that would have to be detennined before the Court could ,, 
say that there was no negligence on behalf of the defend-
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ants or either one of them. A very material fact would be 
whether or not Mrs. Richardson knew at the time she 
advised Mrs. Tempest that the light was on that Mrs. 
Tempest had already passed the entr.ance to the bathroom 
and was in the hallway. Another fact would be whether 
or not 1\frs. Richardson knew that the light was on in the 
den or bedroom. These two facts are very important for 
the reason that if Mrs. Richardson answered both of these 
questions in the affirmative she knew or should have 
known that l\Irs. Tempest would then have been misguid-
ed and led to the bedroom rather than the bathroom. 
We also know that Mrs. Richardson was aware or should 
have been aware of the type of stairway just adjacent 
to the door to the den or bedroom. She knew that the 
door opened inwardly. Under such circumstances she had 
a duty to warn Mrs. Tempest of the stairway or to direct 
Mrs. Tempest's attention to the fact that she had passed 
the bathroom. 
The case of Young et al. v. Felornia et al., ______ Utah 
______ , 244 P. 2d 862 (1952) involved a dispute of grazing 
rights in the State of Utah. An appeal was taken by the 
defendants from a summary judgment. The motion of 
summary judgment was b.ased upon the pleadings and a 
stipulation and the issues established by the court in its 
pretrial order. The Court held after quoting Rule 56 (c) 
U.R.C.P. as follows: 
"Under this rule, it is clear that if there is 
any genuine issue as to any material fact, the 
motion should be denied." 
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(b) PLAINTIFF WAS NOT NEGLIGENT. 
Is .an individual negligent who opens a door which 
opens away from him and takes a step forward at the 
same time even though the room or space that he steps 
forward into is dark? Does not one have the right to 
assume that where a door opens inwardly that there will 
be .a floor beyond, not just a vacant space and if there is 
a stairway on the other side of the door there will be a 
first step or platform which will be level with the floor~ 
In the present case the facts would not warrant the 
finding of negligence or contributory negligence on the 
part of the plaintiff. 
Plaintiff had been directed to the bathroom. She 
was advised that the light was on. When plaintiff dis-
covered that the romn was not a bathroom, was she not 
justified in trying the door next to it? Would not a 
reasonable and prudent person open a door and take a 
step forward in order to turn on the lightY Certainly we 
would not say that a reasonable and prudent person un-
der such circumstances would push the door wide open 
and stand back rather than take a hold of the door and 
move forward as the door opened, nor would an ordin-
arjl~, reasonable person anticipate and expect that if he 
should take a step forward in the darkness that he would 
be i1n1nediately precipitated down a flight of stairs. 
The ease of Ray v. Consolidated Freightways, _____ _ 
1Jtah ______ , 289 P. 2d 196 (1955) was a case involving the 
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destruction of a truck and trailer claimed to have been 
I 
caused by another truck and trailer approaching on the 
highway. The Court states: 
"Therefore, if there is any reasonable basis, 
either because of the lack of evidence, or from 
the evidence and the fair inferences to be derived 
therefrom, taken in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff, upon which any reasonable mind could 
conclude that it was not convinced by a preponder-
ance of the evidence either (a) that the plaintiff 
was guilty of contributory negligence or (b) that 
such negligence proximately contributed to cause 
the injury, then the refusal of the trial court to 
find plaintiff contributorily negligent must be 
sustained.'' 
Frmn this expression this Court has indicated that 
if reasonable minds could differ as to whether or not the 
acts heretofore referred to constitute contributory negli-
gence, then the m.atter would be a question for a jury to 
determine and certainly would not permit the entry of 
a judgment of dismissal or summary judgment. 
In the case of Rogalski v. Phillips Petrolettm Co., 3 
Utah 2d 203, 282 P. 2d 304, the plaintiff while steam 
cleaning his employer's truck fell into a vat containing 
caustic soda. The Court in discussing the question of 
contributory negligence held as follows: 
"It has been frequently .announced by this 
court that contributory negligence is a question 
for the jury unless all reasonable men must draw 
the same conclusion from the facts as they are 
shown. Shafer v. Keeley Ice Cream Co., 65 Utah 
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46, 234 P. 300, 38 A.L.R. 1523; Lowe v. Salt Lake 
City, 13 Utah 91, 44 P. 1050, 57 Am. St. Rep. 708; 
Baker v. Decker, 117 Utah 15, 212 P. 2d 679. As 
was said in Linden v. Anchor Min. Co., 20 Utah 
134,58P. 355,358: 
" 'Where there is uncertainty as to the exist-
ence of either negligence or contributory negli-
gence, the question is not one of law, but of fact, 
and to be settled by a jury; and this, whether the 
uncertainty arises from a conflict in the testimony, 
or because, the facts being undisputed, fair-minded 
men will honestly draw different conclusions from 
them.'" 
The c.ase of Nielson v. Mauchley, 115 Utah 68, 202 
P. 2d 54 7 ( 1949) involved an intersection accident. The 
Court states : 
" 'Each case must turn upon its o"'Ll f.acts. 
Contributory negligence as a matter of law, can 
only be found where reasonable minds cannot but 
conclude that a reasonable careful and prudent 
person situated as was plaintiff would not have 
acted as he did. The situations where a court will 
so declare are rare. * * *" 
In the case of J(Jii.qllf v. Soutl1en1 Pac. Co., 52 Utah 
42, 172 P. 689 (1918) brought for the recovery of the 
negligent killing of certain horses the defendant set up 
the defense of contributory negligence and the Court held 
in discussing contributory negligence as follows: 
"While it is true, and this court has so held 
in cases too numerous to cite here, that the ques-
tion of contributory negligence on the part of the 
plaintiff, like that of original negligence on the 
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p.art of the defendant, is ordinarily a question of 
fact for the jury, and can only in rare instances 
be disposed of as a question of law, yet it is also 
true that this court, in common with other courts, 
has also very frequently held that, where the 
evidence is undisputed and is not conflicting, and 
is such that reasonable men may not deduce con-
flicting inferences therefrom or arrive at differ-
ent conclusions, then the question of necessity is 
purely one of law to be determined by the court." 
The Washington Supreme Court in the case of 
Wardhattgh v. Weisfield's, Inc., supra, states: 
"The issue of contributory negligence should 
not be taken from the jury unless the acts done 
were so palpably negligent as to preclude the 
possibility of a difference of opinion. McBeath v. 
Northern Pac. R. Co., 32 Wash. 2d 910, 204 P. 2d 
248." 
"Nor is contributory negligence chargeable 
to one who was deceived by .appearances calcu-
lated to deceive an ordinarily prudent person. 
Brandenburg v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 28 
Cal. 2d 282, 169 P. 2d 909 ~ Bradley v. Allis Hotel 
Co., 153 Kan. 166, 109 P. 2d 165; Rue v. Wendland, 
226 l\1inn. 449, 33 N.W. 2d 593; Manley v. Haus, 
113 Vt. 217, 32 A. 2d 668." 
38 Am. Jur., Section 184, Page 861. 
"As it generally is expressed, a plaintiff will 
not be held to have been guilty of contributory 
negligence if it appe.ars that he had no knowledge 
or means of knowledge of the danger, and con-
versely, he will be deemed to have been guilty if 
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it is shown that he knew or reasonably should have 
known of the peril and might have avoided it by 
the exercise of ordinary care." 
This statement is cited with approval in the case of 
Martin v. Jones, ______ Utah ______ , 253 P. 349 and in the case 
of Knox v. Snow, ______ ·utah ______ , 229 P. 2d 874. 
In conclusion, we respectfully submit that there are 
material questions of fact to be determined before it can 
be stated that Mr. or Mrs. Richardson were not negligent, 
and from the -evidence introduced it cannot be said, as a 
matter of law, that the plaintiff was negligent, and the 
court erred in entering its summary judgment. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GUSTIN, RICHARDS & 1\;IATTSSON 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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